This article examines Russia’s reaction to political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the interplay between the democracy promotion policies implemented by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratization 다운로드. We argue that despite the relatively weak impact of EU and US policies vis-a-vis domestic structures, Russia has responded harshly to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist agenda in pursuit of reasserting its own hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space 다운로드. However, coercive pressure from Russia has also unintended, counterproductive effects. We argue that the pressure has actually made Georgia and Ukraine more determined to pursue their pro-Western orientation and has spawned democratization, thereby supporting the objectives of the Western democracy promoters s플래너.
Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?: Russia’s role in Georgia and Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), 459-478
Authors, Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, propose an approach called ‘‘engagement without recognition’’ for Western policy toward Abkhazia to challenge the territory’s international isolation and monopolization of influence by Russia 다운로드. According to this strategy, Abkhazia would be given the opportunity to engage with the West on a number of political, economic, social, and cultural issues for the purpose of lessening Russia’s influence 최신 음악 다운로드. While undertaking this strategy, the West must make it clear that Abkhazia’s status as an independent state will never be accepted by either the United States or the EU 아이나비 맵 데이터 다운로드. By separating the international legal dimensions of sovereignty (the question of non-recognition) from its governance aspects, the West can attempt to gain some needed strategic leverage over Abkhazia, which it currently lacks 각시탈 게임.
Cooley, A., & Mitchell, L. A. (2010). Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States 다운로드. The Washington Quarterly, 33(4), 59-73.
At first glance, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 seemed little more than the stuff of adventure-book fantasy: a reawakened empire going to battle against an old viceroyalty over a mountainous principality of negligible strategic value to either side Show by rock download. But it reality, it was an attempt to bypass established channels of conflict resolution and unilaterally change the boundaries of another UN member state 평붓체 폰트 다운로드. For future historians, the South Ossetian crisis will mark a time when Russia came to disregard existing international institutions and began, however haltingly, to fashion its own 다운로드.
King, C. (2008). The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow after the Georgia Crisis. Foreign Affairs, 87, 2 다운로드.
Based on the analysis of public attitudes in Georgia through opinion polls, this paper argues that although Georgian society shares the official westward aspiration, when scrutinized deeply Georgian attitudes are less compatible with some basic “European” values such as tolerance towards minorities, interpersonal trust, gender equality and elite challenging activities 다운로드. Weakness of the value orientation raises a question about validity of approach discussing Georgia’s genuine Westward aspiration from the cultural perspective 다운로드.
Minesashvili, S. (2013). How European Are We? Explaining Georgia’s Westward Aspiration 샌드 박스 다운로드. Foreign Policy & Security Programme, Center for Social Sciences
Four ‘global paradigms’ in Georgian political culture appear to affect or to have affected Georgian foreign policy making. They are religion, attitudes towards the ‘West’, pan-Caucasianism and anti-Russianism, as revealed by evidence from three recently written Georgian national security documents 다운로드. Although the importance of culture in Georgian foreign policy decision making should not be overrated, it has an important place among Georgian political elites in defining their regional and international environment 다운로드.
Jones, S. (2003). The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19(3), 83-110