This volume places the Russo-Georgian conflict in the context of Russia’s broader objectives, the country’s internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America’s security priorities 다운로드. It also offers recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises 다운로드.
Bugajski, J. (2010). Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe. CSIS.
The U.S. policy of unconditional support for Georgia’s government and its disinterest in drawing attention to the new government’s democratization shortcomings call into question how serious the United States is about democracy-promotion, particularly in countries that have a semi-democratic but pro-American government Faster than light download.
Mitchell, L. A. (2006). Democracy in Georgia since the rose revolution. Orbis, 50(4), 669-676.
전쟁의 대가들 다운로드Security problems of Georgia and the Caucasus are frequently analysed in terms of conflict, geopolitics and pipeline diplomacy. This study, however, awards those aspects subsidiary roles and turn focus to national security actors, international structures and security cooperation 윈도우 10 msdn 다운로드. Hence, the objective of this study is to critically assess Georgia’s security as of the year 2003, by seeking to answer three separate questions, namely: 1 일본 카카오톡 다운로드. What is the current status of Georgian’s national security structures? 2. What are the current options and implications for Georgia concerning international security structures? 3 낚시신공. What long-term issues and risks are connected to the US-Georgian security cooperation?
Larsson, R. (2003). Georgia’s Search for Security: An Analysis of Georgia’s National Security Structures and International Cooperation 다운로드. Occasional Paper No.1, Georgian Foundation for Security and International Studies, Tbilisi.
Caucasia has become an area of contention, like much of post-Soviet Eurasia, between the East and West. The South Caucasus has provided the first opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its will to prevent the United States, NATO, and the European Community from penetrating the southern tier of the former USSR 다운로드. Russia’s policy in Caucasia is not a program of imperial control, but rather a determined effort to contain or even roll back the influence of other powers, most importantly, the United States and NATO in the regions closest to Russia’s borders 짠짜라 다운로드. Up until August 2008 it used primarily ‘‘soft power’’ vigorously to prevent other powers from increasing their influence in the region. In August it demonstrated it was prepared, when pushed, to use ‘‘hard power.’’ The Russo– Georgian War was a watershed in East–West relations with a more assertive Russia willing to take on its more powerful competitors visual studio 2015 iso.
The main argument of this paper is that neither the Georgian nor Russian government has changed its position in the conflict or its underlying assumptions about regional politics — this situation sets the “frozen” conflict on an unavoidable collision course over the next few years 다운로드. This danger is also due to a certain angle entertained by the current Georgian leadership in its confrontation with Russia as a response to the obvious power asymmetry between the two countries 스나이퍼 엘리트 다운로드. First, the Georgian government cautiously sought to undermine Russia’s authority in the North Caucasus. Second, Saakashvili apparently tried to re-open the rift in US-Russian relations in order to capitalize on the two great powers’ differences 다운로드. This paper examines underlying assumptions and possible implications of these two approaches.
Khelashvili, G. (2011). Georgian Perceptions of the North Caucasus and of U.S.-Russian Relations 다운로드. PONARS Eurasia Memo 148