This chapter analyzes the failure of Georgia’s defense and security policies and the challenges confronting the country’s leadership. It explores the various stages in the history of building the Georgian Army, from the late 1980s until the Rose Revolution of 2003. It lays out the systemic shortcomings of the process and explains a series of dramatic events that shook political–military relations. Then the problem of civilian control over the armed forces—including the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the government, the question of the defense budget, and the corruption among the military—is analyzed. It also addresses the challenge of developing a national security concept. Finally, this chapter analyzes new trends in defense policy and military reform after the Rose Revolution.
Darchiashvili, D. (2005). Georgian defense policy and military reform. In B. Coppieters & R. Legvold (eds.). Statehood and Society: Georgia After the Rose Revolution (pp. 117-151). Boston: The MIT Press
