Georgia’s August War with Russia prompted a new wave of political mobilization against the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili after a previous effort faltered in 2007–2008 폴라리스 오피스 2015 다운로드. Despite its renewed vigor, the postwar opposition failed for at least three reasons: 1) increased levels of political discontent did not translate to broad public support for the president’s resignation; 2) the opposition remained divided with regard to its methods and aims; and 3) the government successfully represented itself as an alternative engine of democratization 다운로드.
Welt, C. (2009). Still Staging Democracy: Contestation and Conciliation in Postwar Georgia. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 17(3), 196-227 윤고딕 200 다운로드.
While the proximate causes of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war have yet to be satisfactorily investigated, an assessment of an earlier occasion of conflict in South Ossetia in 2004 can lay the groundwork for an analysis of the later war 말해 뭐해 mp3. Like the 2008 war, the 2004 conflict was comprehensible on the basis of the ambitious war plans of opposing sides, but it was ultimately rooted in a security dilemma 유닉스 ftp 다운로드. The conflict thus provides a precedent for considering how a mix of limited offensive intentions, insecurity, uncertainty, and cognitive shortcuts and misperceptions had the capacity to lead to inadvertent war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia 티 맵 다운로드.
Welt, C. (2010). The thawing of a frozen conflict: the internal security dilemma and the 2004 prelude to the Russo-Georgian War. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(1), 63-97 프로토타입 2 다운로드.