

National Society and Imperatives of Modern Security

1. *Why nation*

We live in such collective communities that are grouped by national characteristic, or more precisely, by national label. Thus, we have a national identity at least by passport, language or the manner of paying or evading taxes, even if we did not pay or were not able to pay attention to it. “Nationality makes people feel good”, says Leah Greenfeld, a world-renowned researcher of nationalism¹. This phrase pushes us towards psychology and social psychology. Referring to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the belongingness to a nation can be discerned on the third and fourth levels of this hierarchy, in connection with belonging and self-esteem needs. The belongingness to the nation, however, is no less important to meet the needs characteristic for the fifth, self-actualization level, which are, in essence, cognitive needs. Moreover, an incentive for the belongingness to a nation can be found on the second level, i.e. in the needs for security.²

The benefit or the necessity of a democratic political system for a social development and the satisfaction of an individual’s physiological, psychological or cognitive needs is now acknowledged worldwide. It is also recognized that a modern democracy and nationalism are hard to be imagined and implemented separately. *As Jean Daniel noted, “the search of democracy could have preceded the creation of modern nations, but in essence, they are twin concepts: it is impossible to separate territorial nation and popular sovereignty”*³. Building a viable state requires not only agreed rules of political game but also shared values, common dreams and desires. Democracy alone, without nationalism, fails to explain why it should be built autonomously on any territory, why states should not disintegrate or integrate through, say, regularly held referendums.

A sense of national identity is linked with culture. Culture, however, is nothing else but a set of existing “patterns” for transmitting and obtaining experience. People act in accordance with their “own definitions of situation” and with own “rules” that are appropriate to these situations. These rules, i.e. culture, are not universal. As Harold Scheffer notes, the most ‘irrational’ or ‘illogical’ behavior of the so-called primitive peoples is nothing else but a behavior which differs from the behavior we expect to be appropriate in a concrete situation. This difference emerges from the reality that participants in the behavior evaluate and understand the situation in different

ways.⁴ Culture, of course, is not a national phenomenon alone. There could be more than one culture and counterculture within the institutionally and legally organized “nation”. Though, it is also clear that an overwhelming majority of researchers in nationalism link nation, people, to the formation of a mass, uniform culture which is formulated by ideologists and spread through education system and mass media. One may say that mass media has turned culture into a global, post-national phenomenon but this opinion seems exaggerated because the world still remains divided into nations.

John Locke reckoned that a state is not created on the basis of pragmatic estimations alone and that a sense of “justice”, or the drive towards it, is no less important. He believed that morality does not stem from the desire to obtain personal benefit but vice versa⁵. However “justice” and “morality” are historical and cultural categories acquired and comprehended by various societies in different ways. Therefore, a state or a democracy is tied to culture the optimal and most enduring form of which has always been a nation-state.

In order to implement a collective political project, most of the population of a territory, named country, should form a pragmatic interest of its members and social groups. World outlook and cultural features and ties should also be taken into account. A sense of collective identity is an essential aspect and is one of the most important variables for the functioning of any political system

2. Since when nation

It is impossible to scientifically deny today that a nation is a historical category, i.e., it did not always exist and may disappear. Moreover, it would not or could not have been created concurrently across the world. Leah Greenfeld attributes great importance in the creation of a nation to such socio-psychological state as existential envy. “Ressentiment”, the term introduced by Nietzsche, which is used by the researcher to describe this state, stems, on the one hand, from the alienation of a certain group of people from an existing socio-political or economic order, anomie, and on the other hand, from the jealousy towards other, a more advanced society⁶. Greenfeld considers the actualization of the Russian national idea to be an outcome of the 18th century and links it to the competition and confrontation of some Russian aristocracy with European societies.

Anthony Smith echoes Greenfeld’s assertions in his own way when concluding that “ethnies”⁷ used to “awaken”, i.e., to develop their national self-consciousness in copying from each other⁸.

It should be consequently assumed that the exact time of the formation of a nation cannot be established - in separate cases, it could have happened in various ways and in different epochs. Hence, the job of social scientists and historians - the exploration of concrete circumstances of the birth of nations and individual cultures - becomes crucial. However, dominating modern or postmodern social theories, ruling out the so-called primordialism, i.e. the existence of nations since early human history, place an emphasis on specific socio-economic or cultural-political conditions and regard a nation as well as nationalism to be an outcome of the modernization of societies, the demolition of agrarian or feudal hierarchies.

According to the theories, to be briefly discussed later in this paper, the term nation is the old one but its meaning was absolutely different before, at least, 16th century⁹. The point is that this Latin term, meaning “birth” (*natio* - birth; being born), was used in medieval ages to describe mainly communities of university professors or students. There was hardly a mention of representatives of contemporary European nations at those times (for example, Prague University, in 1349, mentions Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon and various Polish nations)¹⁰, even more so of their common political self-identity or political project which is the basic foundation of nationalism.

Nevertheless, names and boundaries of nations can change, which means that the Saxon self-identity could eventually mix up with that of German. Besides, in a number of classical or early medieval texts this term has a more modern, political connotation. In 44 BC, for example, Cicero wrote to Mark Antony: “All races are able to bear enslavement, but our community cannot”¹¹. Holy Roman Empire’s legate at the court of Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus II tied the language and origin of population to a political belongingness when, in 968, while confronting Emperor, declared: “The land... which you say belongs to your empire belongs, as the nationality and language of the people proves, to the kingdom of Italy”¹². Similar correlations of culture, nation, language and politics can be observed in Georgian historical sources of earlier periods than any discussion on modern Georgian nation and nationalism could have taken place. The best example of this is an excerpt from a literary work by the 10th century hagiographer, Ioane Merchule, about Kartli as an entire country where the liturgy is conducted in Georgian.

These examples, I think, illustrate that a social identity based upon cultural layers was in the foundation of the state-building for centuries. But no agreement is reached within the scope of social science on whether this identity was national, in the modern sense of this word, or how different, in qualitative terms, modern and pre-modern political identities are.

3. What is the basis a nation is created on

At the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, nationalists and Marxists believed that a modern nation was a historically formed stable unity built on the basis of common language, shared territory, common economic activity and psychological and cultural peculiarities. But a nation, for the overwhelming majority of modern social scientists, is not a community sharing only common language and common ancestors or the belief in having common ancestors. Nor is it limited to common political sympathies and antipathies of large social communities.

Modern studies in nationalism carried out mainly by representatives of a diverse so-called modernist school somewhat reflect post-modern views as well. By reinterpreting some provisions of Marxism, this school has been engaged in identifying the phases in the formation of a nation and the agents of these phases. It also tries to identify the degree of inconsistency between the structure and values of industrial and pre-industrial societies. The conclusion, despite its various interpretations, is that a nation is not a mere historical construct but also rather an artificial one and its formation was prompted by individual or group frustrations of intellectuals, marginalized from traditional elites, or/and by the desire of post-feudal and post-imperial state agents to create a uniform, culturally homogenous mass of subordinates. To this end, nation-builders employed folklore, myths, created history, as the only way to form a nation was to generate a sense of super-class solidarity among ordinary people by using a common past (with the achievements or failures of common ancestors).

At the same time, modernists study a beneficial influence of impersonal, economic and technological forces upon the above mentioned processes. The point is that the modernization was not only and not as much an intellectual process as those forms of trade, war, communication that were incompatible with a traditional, class lifestyle and required from people a new society - enhanced and horizontal solidarity. Social origin was being replaced by individual professionalism, but the social stability and policy needed not an anarchic unity of atomized individuals or professional craftsmen but a new solidarity and homogeneity, accordingly, the nation.

As mentioned above, nationalism is linked with democracy, but not every kind of nationalism is associated with the protection of human rights. According to Greenfield, there are, on the one hand, individualistic and collectivistic nations and on the other hand, some of them are civic and some ethnic. Greenfield believes that individualistic and civic nations give rise to liberal-democratic societies whereas collectivistic and ethnic nations - to vari-

ous forms of authoritarianism¹³. Anyway, if nationalism is, first of all, the condition causing the break up of a class society, or associated with this break-up, and grouping people by national features, it is impossible that this process does not equip individuals, named as citizens of nation-state, with an imaginative or real political power. What definitely distinguishes a political system of the feudal epoch from that of the modern epoch is the democratic idea of popular sovereignty.

Let me quote some examples of modernists' reasoning: Ernest Gellner reckons that the industrialization brings about literacy and hence, the spread of education across the entire population as, given the new nature of work demands, each inhabitant of a political entity tends to become a literate clerk. In a pre-modernist society nationalism could not have existed because the elite saw no need in spreading culture among lower strata of producers. Under market economy, however, it is impossible to achieve full homogeneity and a new spiral of confrontation between rich and poor starts (a nationalistic propaganda could be an additional argument for the desire to mitigate it - D.D.). This confrontation can, however, support and further expand nationalism if the poor and the rich in a modernizing pre-national or multiethnic national political system belong to different linguistic groups.

Michael Mann and Anthony Giddens reckon that a nation is formed by a centralized state with its bureaucracy, striving to make the government uniform, and with associated large institutions (parliaments, schools, labor markets, courts and widespread literature). A modernist camp, somewhat engaged in a postmodernist discourse, with Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities" being the most famous piece of work, put an emphasis on a qualitative difference between pre-modern and modern discourse and imagination skills. For Anderson a nation is such a unity of emotion, will, imagination and perception, who gets familiar with literature printed in a vernacular, measures time by clock and calendar and whose representatives escape from personal oblivion, death, through generating a sense of belongingness to an "imagined" national community.

Eric Hobsbawm sees the formation of nations as a deliberate action by "elite craftsmen" and attributes an insignificant importance to the quality or authenticity of pre-national, ethnic cultural material in this process. Incidentally, Gellner stated the same, though in his own way, seeing the importance of the use of fragments of old culture in the formation of a modern nation and even considering it unnecessary.¹⁴

Schematically, modernists view the genesis of a nation as the imagination of a nation by frustrated intellectuals or ambitious leaders under the influence of invisible modernizing forces. In this case, pre-modern institutions

or cultures are of a secondary importance. Following Gellner's definition, nationalistic ideology creates nations and not the other way round.

Some contradictions are, however, characteristic for this school of thought. Hobsbawm, for example, thinks that proto-national communities can also be discovered in pre-modern periods and sees the role of the memory of earlier political and cultural institutions played in the creation of a modern mass nationalism in England, France, Russia and Serbia.

Anthony Smith, known as a representative of ethnosymbolism, a school of scholars in nationalism, sees a completely different relation between pre-modern and modern epochs. He does not deny that nation and nationalism are the products of the modern epoch and, in essence, acknowledges the righteousness of many of the above quoted arguments. But for him, the nationalism is directly linked to a sense of solidarity and ethnic identification existing beyond centuries. Smith introduces the term *ethnie* to describe such cultural groups which possessed collective identities for centuries and represented the basis for modern nations. According to his definition, *ethnie* is a named population sharing a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, an association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. As regards the nation, it is defined as a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members. Smith believes that *ethnie* can also be politically organized and numerous. What distinguishes nation is a type of mass public culture, common economy and common legal rights and duties¹⁵.

Smith also reckons that such institutions, the carriers of ethnic identity and culture in pre-modern epochs, as linguistic codes, rituals, homelands or markets and armies were inclusive enough not to imagine that the only means of population's homogenization was printed book or bureaucracy that is characteristic for modernism alone.

As a conclusion it could be said that nationalism is not only and not as much a rational state of the mind as emotional. Otherwise, people would not have risked their wellbeing for national interests. Despite very interesting and widely spread studies of modernists, nationalism continues to be a fundamental driving force of international and domestic political processes. Although it could be a fiction invented by individual intellectuals where historical annals say nothing about its roots, this "fiction" still stirs up a sense of solidarity in millions of people. To prove or foster the value of this solidarity people, even in the most civic and individualistic nation, are sincerely inclined to search roots of nationalism in pre-modern stages. As Ghia Nodia states,

“these two types of nationalisms (civic and ethnic – D.D.) are ideal ones. Any real instance of nationalism contains the elements of both types”¹⁶.

Nation and nationalism is a risky unity and ideology because people, under national flags, tend to ignore their own as well as others lives. However, an international system is arranged in such a way and an individual’s basic requirements build up such a hierarchy that a nation-state still remains to be an irreplaceable institution for ensuring individual as well as collective security.

4. Nation and security

As the key function of a nation-state is to define and protect national interests, the security policy with its implementing sector is core to the state. This maxim has been well understood by politicians and political theorists since, at least, 16-17th centuries. Many historians and political scientists believe that Cardinal Richelieu pursued this principle when, being a catholic clergyman himself, made France fight in support of Protestants. Nicollo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, actually, advocated for national interests and the state as of the mechanism for ensuring the security. These scholars are of special interest to the researchers of the formation of ethnic-national self-identity, i.e. the origins of nationalism.¹⁷

Hobbes advocates for the absolute power of authority and, using a modern security discourse, regards even religion as a sphere to be controlled by the national security institutions¹⁸. John Locke, on the other hand, thinks that no religion shall be subject to any prohibition by the state unless it calls for or instigates violence¹⁹. The latter thesis is quite close in its nature to a modern discourse on human rights as well as to principles of individual or human security having developed along with and in parallel to the national security²⁰.

Thus, the security - both individual and national - depends on the existence and efficiency of a state. Citizens are united by the needs for esteem and self-realization as well as the desire to support each other in the fight for survival. That means that the abovementioned Maslow’s hierarchy of needs cannot be satisfied individually and therefore, as political theorists say, a social contract is formed and the state created. To achieve this, according to the logic of psychology or political theory, a sense of nationalism - be it collectivistic-ethnic or individualistic-civic - is needed. Should nationalism be discarded neither the state nor the security would remain. Everything else - the drive towards super-national unity and security institutions, or the shift of

the center of gravity of *politeia* onto sub-national frames - is imperfect, or/and remains the sphere of imagination.

The question of how a modern nation differs from old communities and what distinguishes one from the other is the key to modern or post-modern constructivist sociological/anthropological theories on nation and nationalism. Answers to this question are certainly quite interesting to understand the past and the present of societies. But for researches of security and international relations, with their majority viewing the security policy as the sphere of subjective or inter-subjective perceptions²¹, the crucial point is that people trust in nation and national interests. This is the risk but at the same time the only realistic basis for ensuring security which a state and consequently, a national and human interest rest upon.

A special interconnection between a national and regional security and an ethnically-tinted nationalism is observed in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet space²². From the Western standpoint, this interconnection can be perceived as threat rather than security. Scholars or diplomats still witness ongoing ethnic conflicts there. However, as said above, ethnically-tinted nationalism also contains a positive potential for ensuring security and the Eastern Europe/post-Soviet space, where *only ethnic mythology convinces societies of the need in state/national independence*, is an additional proof of this.

The West, be it NATO, the EU or bilateral donors, is taking efforts for the democratization and liberalization of mentioned societies. This necessarily requires that the supremacy of law, developed civil society, pluralistic political society, effective bureaucracy and free economic society be built²³. But *whereas the issue of identity is of a secondary importance for those states that have a long experience in operating state institutions, it is the cornerstone of building statehood, i.e. democracy, for some, still frail post-communist countries.*

Geopolitical context of post-Communist, especially, post-Soviet countries adds to the international legitimacy and significance of their ethno-political identities. Internal, socio-cultural factor, which today works in favor of the independence of Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan or any other country, is ethnic beliefs, imaginations and myths. Advocacy for human rights alone cannot explain as to why it is impossible for, say, Georgians to build a common political future with Russians. But the existence of these new states and their independence from Russia is not just a whim of local politicians. It reflects interests of many international actors as well. Therefore, the increase in the attention to essential incentives for the independence of post-Soviet countries assumes international importance.

It requires a collective imagination and dreaming to maintain unity. In the long run, it is precisely the nationalism that is needed, with liberalism and democ-

racy having a mission of preventing its extreme manifestations. Thus, in order to curb nationalism, which has become a cause of tragedy for many nations and contributed to the demise of many states, and to build a consolidated democracy, the same nationalism should be supported.

This is a challenge. Assuming that nationalism is a threat and, at the same, a pillar of national, regional or international security, the choice faced by politicians becomes a dilemma. An example of the dilemma is not only and not limited to a possibility that the encouragement of nationalism may entail counter-nationalisms and conflicts with other countries or ethnic minorities. The dilemma exists at the level of international law too and is expressed in the conflict between the principle of territorial integrity of states and the principle of nations' self-determination. The solution cannot be universal, independent from time and space. It rather depends on a concrete situation, the maturity of states in question and their political elites. As Leah Greenfield notes, people are equal, whilst nations are not and the rights of nations assume starkly different significance in various circumstances²⁴. According to Anthony Smith, a number of scholars the violence on the grounds of nationalism escalates when and if the state is weak²⁵.

5. Prospects of the Georgian nation

The issue of the birth of the Georgian nation follows the logic and the dynamics of those attempts to explain the birth of a nation that were discussed above. The same holds true for the importance of the existence of the Georgian nation from the security policy standpoint. The attempt of constructivist explanation of the birth of the Georgian nation is associated with Ronald Suny's name. As Suny notes, Georgian ethnic-cultural features existed for centuries but before being incorporated into Russia hardly anyone, except for a few nobles and clergymen, possessed a sense of their own nationhood. Using a Marxist thesis about the origin of classes, Suny reckons that the Georgian nation was formed first "in itself" (objective demographic existence) and than "for itself" (organized-mobilized unity) at the end of 19th century²⁶. It is natural that such conclusions are seriously questioned by modern Georgian historians, in contrast to Georgian sociologists and political scientists. But the problem again is what one calls a nation and how to differentiate it from ethnos or any pre-modern class society.

In political terms, as well as in terms of future prospects, more important is the results of a sociological survey, conducted several years ago, which

suggest that *the majority of the country's population, both Georgians and ethnic minorities, identify themselves with ethnos rather than with citizenship*²⁷.

It was for the first time ever that, after the revolution in 2003, the president of the country tailored his discourse to the idea of a super-ethnic, civic nation in such a way as not to deny popular ethno-nationalistic icons²⁸. If the above said is complemented with systemic steps taken towards the introduction of critical reasoning in education instead of ideological-scholastic teaching, these processes can be assessed as revolutionary-transformative. Yet, too little time has passed to talk about any success of an effective symbiosis of ethnic and civic identities. A very serious impediment to the victory of the concept of a civic nation, if such possible, is the reality that masses regard a quite influential Orthodox Christianity not only as an individual way of transcendental revelation but also as a necessary attribute for Georgians.

Another issue is the infancy and consequently, the weakness of the Georgian state. By the year 2003, the Georgian political system, which had undergone civil and ethno-territorial conflicts, resembled, typologically, a mafia-dominated state. The signs of this are the state's inability to meet basic demands of the population and the mafia's ability to operate its own mechanism for protecting business and ordinary citizens. In 2004 the new authority started war against mafia. The war inevitably creates a real conflict between the imperatives of security, supremacy of the law and the protection of human rights. The situation further aggravates if the state lacks experience in using force in proportional and adequate manner.

Anticorruption measures undertaken in parallel with the fight against organized crime and efforts to optimize the state administration brought about "side effects" - the closure of customary sources of income for thousands of people and the feeling of "offended dignity". The latter was exacerbated by a revolutionary pace of reforms which led to the sacrifice of certain requirements for the so-called participatory democracy. A concrete implementing mechanism for this requirement of a modern democracy, such as the cooperation of government bodies with a non-governmental sector, grew weaker. The relation between some government and media representatives worsened. As a result, an instinctive coalition against the government has been formed, which united and unites, among others, organizations specializing in human rights, representatives of arts and culture who, always used to be in favor, found themselves sidelined by the government, those who were suspicious about western values and adepts of the customs of former life. All this is complemented with such a classical problem of the national security as the violation of territorial integrity and tense relations with Russia.

Thus, when discussing future prospects of the Georgian nation, one should take into account internal, socio-political and cultural problems as well as foreign policy problems. Altogether they fall within the scope of the state and national security - the objective of the security policy is to protect basic interests of the so-called referent object, in this particular case, of a person, nation and state²⁹. The problems, mentioned above, are perceived by their “victims” as the violation of their basic interests. The failure to solve them, which does not at all mean satisfying personal ambitions of every individual, poses risk to Georgia’s statehood.

In order to build a modern nation and ensure its security, the Georgian government, in the nearest future, shall:

- Reach agreement on such a formulae of national identity that will strike a balance between ethnicity and citizenship that is acceptable for the majority of population. It should reflect the requirement for the allegiance to ethnic beliefs, religion and liberal-democratic principles;
- Effectively and vigorously continue the fight against national threats, but conduct it in a framework where human rights are observed and the rule of law strengthened;

6. Conclusion

Answers to a question as to when a nation, or particularly, Georgian nation, was born will never be perfect. According to Ernest Renan, nationality is a daily plebiscite. I think that some signs of nationality appeared at those times, when medieval narratives started discussing the importance of the Georgian language and mentioning “Georgia”. This does not mean that people living before those times on the territory of Georgia lacked a sense of collective identity. Nor does it mean that self-consciousness of Georgians in the epochs of King David or Queen Tamar was identical to that of the modern epoch. But the constructivism and ethno-symbolism represent the best guides for understanding our past and present.

Nationality is an integral aspect of ensuring human, individual and, at the same time, state security. The proof of it is a collocation - National Security - widely used in this crucial sphere of politics.

Nationalism, especially ethnic and collectivistic, is dangerous. Most of current bloody conflicts are nourished, in this or that form, by nationalism. But there is no nationalism free of every element of ethnic or cultural identity.

Whether the policy of ethnic purification becomes fully effective (as many ethno-nationalists dangerously reason) “depends on many circumstances”.³⁰

At present, many expressly ethnic nations try to master methods of civic nationalism and enrich their culture with cultural features of minorities or impulses of globalization. Given a social-political environment and dominating perception in a number of post-Communist states, one should assume that even ethno-nationalistic beliefs can be the basis to build up a liberal democracy. The latter is the only mean to ensure internal or external peace and stability. At the same time, the universe will remain a multiethnic puzzle in the foreseeable future. Under such circumstances one of general recommendations for building liberal democracies is “to change a political culture, introduce legal and institutional innovations”. This should ensure “coexistence, shared security among various national and ethnic groups”³¹. The above said should make us think about strengthening the multi-national, regional identity and security, along with the national one. This, however, is the topic of a separate analysis.

Notes:

- 1 Leah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge 1992, p.490.
- 2 <http://honolulu.hawaii.edu/intranet/committees/FacDevCom/guidebk/teachtip/maslow.htm>
- 3 Jean Daniel, *Democracy and Nation*, In: *The Democratic Invention*, ed. by Marc F. Plattner and Joao Carles Espada, Baltimore 2000, p.82.
- 4 Harold W. Scheffer, *Structuralism in Anthropology*, In: *Structuralism*, ed. By Jacques Ehrmann, Garden City, NY 1970, p.56
- 5 Locke, *Sochinenia*, T. 3 AN SSSR, Moskva 1988 p. 53 (In Russian).
- 6 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, pp.15-16, p. 488.
- 7 Anthony Smith uses this term to describe ethnic groups being on a pre-national stage and having a sense close to nationalism.
- 8 Anthony D. Smith, *The Rise of Nations*, In: *Nationalism*, ed. by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Oxford University Press 1994; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism*, *Survival*, Vol. 35, # 1, Spring 1993, pp. 48-62.
- 9 For Greenfeld, as well as many other prominent scholars of nationalism, the first nation was born in England in the 16th century.
- 10 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation>

- 11 M. Tullius Cicero, *Orations: The fourteen orations against Marcus Antonius (Philippics)* (ed. C. D. Yonge) <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu>
- 12 *Relatio de legatione Constantinopolitana ad Nicephorum Phocam*. Online translation at <http://medieval.ucdavis.edu/20A/Luitprand.htm>
- 13 Leah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, p.488.
- 14 This overview is primarily based on: Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge 2001, pp. 87-120. Also, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 2004, pp. 18, 26-28; Roger Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1994, and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity*.
- 15 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, p. 36, p. 204. Also, Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism, Survival*, Vol. 35, # 1, Spring 1993, pp. 48-62.
- 16 Ghia Nodia, *Nationalism and the Crisis of Liberalism*, In: *Europe's New Nationalism, States and Minorities in Conflict*, Ed. by Richard Caplan and John Feffer, Oxford 1996, p.106.
- 17 In his political tractates Machiavelli seems to have a sense of Italian identity, whilst Hobbes and Locke may be perceived as an intellectual image of British national idea (See, for example, Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*), having formed earlier than Italian or any other European nationalism.
- 18 Of the Causes, Generation, and definition of a Commonwealth, Chapter XVII; Of Dominion Paternal and despotical, Chapter XX; In: Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, at: <http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/index.html>
- 19 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, translated by William Popple at: http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/locke/locke2/locke-t/locke_tolerant.html
- 20 See, for example, *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*, Issues, DFID, 2002; *Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*, Development Assistance Committee. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1998; *Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development*, DAC, Government of Canada 1998 (Final Report and Follow up to the 1997 Ottawa Symposium);
- 21 Accordingly, the constructivism occupies an important place in these studies. See, for example, Arnold Wolfers "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", in: *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 67, n. 4, 1958, pp. 481-502; Barry Byzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London 1998.

- 22 Gabriel Sheffer describes the political systems of this region as ethnic states. See, Gabriel Sheffer, *The Security of Small Ethnic States: A Counter Neo-realist Argument*, in: *The National Security of small states in changing world*, ed. by Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, Portland 1997.
- 23 Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stephan, *Toward Consolidated Democracy*, Journal of Democracy, Volume 7, # 2, April 1996, pp. 16-22.
- 24 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity*, p. 490.
- 25 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, p.107.
- 26 Roger Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, pp. 114-115.
- 27 Theodor Hanf and Ghia Nodia, *Georgia Lurching to Democracy*, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 92-102.
- 28 It is of utmost importance a phrase repeated over and over again by Saakashvili that for those who hate Ossetians, Armenians or any other minority, he is an Ossetian, Armenian, etc. He has managed to harmonize the advocacy for super-ethnic unity with the Georgian ethno-nationalistic ideology, where idealized images of the deeds of the kings of pre-modern epoch and a special role of Orthodox Christianity occupy a significant place.
- 29 Barry Byzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.
- 30 Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism*, Survival, Vol. 35, # 1, Spring 1993, pp. 48-62.
- 31 Larry Diamond, *Is the Third Wave Over?* Journal of Democracy, Vol 7, # 3, July 1996.