This paper is based on the author’s personal experience as the leader of a democracy think tank in Georgia for about twenty years, but also on numerous interviews and discussions with colleagues in the civil society and political communities.

The initial intention was to focus on “democracy research organizations” or “democracy think tanks.” However, one has to keep in mind that in Georgia, there are no clear lines dividing such organizations from, on the one hand, activist groups that try to influence policy primarily through advocacy campaigns, and on the other, public-policy think tanks that may concentrate on topics other than development of a democratic political system as such. The paper will at times describe this broader pool of organizations, often referred to as the “third sector,” while at other times it will specifically address organizations dedicated to democratic development. This issue will be raised again below, but it is useful to make it clear at the outset.

**Measuring the Relevance of Public Policy Research**

Are think tanks, particularly those focused on democracy issues, important for a fledgling democracy like Georgia? To be more precise, what is their role in a country that is often described as a “hybrid regime”—neither an autocracy nor a fully developed democracy? The answer largely depends on what one expects from these organizations, or the standards used for measuring their performance.

The United States is often used as a model, because it is the country where think tanks were invented. This model implies that the value of think tanks is measured by their ability to influence public policy. That notion in turn may rest on an assumption that decision makers require some additional intellectual resources to properly design their policies. Even if senior government officials are not prepared to recognize some gaps in their expertise, the fact remains that they do not have the time to concentrate on

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careful research and analysis of specific policy issues. Think tanks, by contrast, have the time, resources, and professional staff to carry out such work, and it is their central mission to do so.

Think tanks do not necessarily need to conduct research commissioned by the government or political parties. However, they are supposed to produce ideas and projects that are usable in principle, and if they are lucky, their ideas will eventually find decision makers willing to implement them. For instance, the policy ideas underlying British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s liberal market reforms, or the “zero tolerance” policies carried out by the New York City Police Department under Mayor Rudy Giuliani, were first developed by think tanks. Whether one likes these particular policies or not, they are powerful examples of think tanks’ ability to have a real impact.

It is difficult to find similar examples in Georgia. When this problem is raised in the country, civil-society organizations typically complain that the government does not listen to them. They often argue that the administration, at least that of the United National Movement (2004–2012), is arrogant and has autocratic rather than democratic instincts. The government headed by President Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003) is generally said to have lacked the capacity to implement coherent policies. When one talks to former government officials, however, they are likely to say that Georgian think tanks themselves lack the capacity to produce ideas that would be useful in a real policy process.

This paper will propose that direct contacts and cooperation between government and public-policy think tanks, and the influence exerted by the latter on the former, while valuable in themselves, should not be the primary measurements of the productivity and impact of such organizations. Both the Georgian civil-society sector and the donor community tend to overestimate these factors when discussing the role and importance of think tanks.

The Georgian Context: Local Civil Society and the West
The role of think tanks is also related to the way in which Georgia positions itself in the world. They are supposed to be generators of ideas for improving public policies. But the grand idea that inspires the country’s policies today is that Georgia should be like the West, and this is especially so in the realm of democracy. Therefore, the West serves as a kind of collective think tank. It is a reservoir of models that should be implemented in Georgia and an ultimate source of public-policy wisdom.

It is not just that Western democracies are there for Georgians to study and emulate. There are also numerous consultants who know how Western models were applied in other countries like Georgia. Western consultants may or may not be listened to, depending on their quality and on the readiness of local policymakers to follow their advice.

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**About the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD)**

The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) is a public policy think-tank, specializing in a broad area of democratic development. CIPDD was founded in 1992 in Tbilisi, Georgia, as a non-governmental and not-for-profit organization. It advocates policy goals such as the development of a vibrant and diverse civil society, effective and accountable public institutions based on the rule of law, and an integrated political community that at the same time respects and preserves the identities of different ethnic and religious communities in Georgia. CIPDD seeks to contribute to the implementation of these goals through producing relevant and high-quality public policy documents and encouraging a pluralistic and informed public policy debate in Georgia.
But a given Georgian decision maker is more likely to accept the recommendations of someone who comes from a country where the state and democracy are already known to work properly, or at least better than in Georgia. Policy suggestions that come directly from the West have greater authority and political clout.

When people from the Georgian “third sector” discuss their role and influence in the country, they tend to complain about a lack of political influence and attention from politicians. This raises the question of how to develop the desired influence.

Under the circumstances, the role of local think tanks and democracy-promoting organizations boils down to properly interpreting what exactly the country can learn from the West, or even more narrowly, what the West is actually recommending at the moment. Governments themselves claim that they are carrying out reforms aimed at making Georgia more like a Western democracy, and that they are following Western recommendations to that end. But civil-society organizations often have two advantages over government officials. First, they may speak better English and have a more thorough understanding of the ways in which Western democracies work. This entitles them to make suggestions and be listened to. More importantly, those involved in power politics may not actually be interested in making the system more democratic, particularly because they are more likely to lose power in a more democratic system. In fact, they can be expected to cheat or drag their feet. Therefore, the main activities of civil-society organizations are monitoring and advocacy. Their role is to verify whether government performance conforms to democratic standards and the government’s own commitments, to expose evasions, and to push for the government to meet democratic norms in practice.

In this effort, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can be considered junior partners and assistants to the West, which, incidentally, also funds them. Of course, local organizations have some autonomy from their funders in prioritizing specific issues at specific moments, but they work within a predefined framework of transferring global (in practice, mostly Western) democratic norms and practices to their home countries. This is a legitimate and useful activity, but it is not necessarily about generating ideas—something think tanks are supposed to do. If local NGOs do generate ideas, they are usually fairly narrow and technical in character.

The situation tends to produce skepticism about the usefulness of think tanks as opposed to activist organizations. Georgians often question the necessity of discussing the institutions and ideas of democracy, arguing that the problem is not a lack of knowledge, but a lack of political will on the part of the government to follow democratic standards. Alternatively, they note that despite opinion polls showing widespread support for democracy, Georgian citizens are simply not active enough to force the government to conform to democratic rules.

In this environment, few resources are available for serious organizations focused on democracy research. Those that claim to be think tanks are rarely “pure” research organizations. But regardless of their self-identification as research or activist groups, NGOs are considered to be primary carriers of knowledge about democracy as well as the main support mechanism for the implementation of democratic practices.

Georgian Reforms and the Think Tank Community: Ideas Following People

If think tanks have few chances to directly influence policymakers in Georgia, how can thinking, research, and debate about democratic development be policy relevant? The first and most effective means is transfer of knowledge through professional rotation between civil-society organizations and the government. In this case, ideas actually follow people.

President Mikheil Saakashvili’s govern-
ment, which came to power after the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” was sometimes called an NGO government because it drew heavily on the human resources of the Georgian civil-society community. Its record on democracy is a matter of debate among scholars and commentators, both in and outside Georgia, but most agree that it has quite a strong record of public-policy reforms, especially but not only in the area of overcoming corruption. Therefore, its activities can be used as a positive case study.

It is difficult to precisely identify the intellectual sources of the Saakashvili government’s reforms. However, people who may be considered architects of reforms underline the importance of experience brought from past work outside government and politics. Some of these figures came from private business and international organizations, but the most typical background was one in the Georgian NGO sector. Its graduates, who largely defined the direction of the new government, carried with them two main assets. First, they had specific ideas and approaches that they had promoted for several years while criticizing the previous government. Second, but no less important, they brought an organizational culture that was oriented toward change and specific results. One of the influential reformers in the government, Vakhtang Lezhava (he usually served at the deputy minister level), believes that reforms slowed down after 2007 in part because there was no comparable new influx of people with NGO backgrounds who could bring fresh ideas and a spirit of radical change.

At the same time, the Saakashvili government was widely criticized for not listening to outside advice, and today its former members confirm that this was largely true. In the first years after the Rose Revolution, they did not have particularly good relations with international development organizations because of their approach to reforms: They did not have the sort of “roadmaps” that the donors tended to favor, inspired instead by a general vision and a desire to achieve results very quickly. Their sense of urgency came from a belief that the political opening for radical reform might soon close. Only after the success of the reforms became obvious did the international entities agree to support the government’s vision.

Georgian officials, despite their civil-society background, similarly neglected the advice of the local NGO sector. They now explain this by citing several factors. First, after the new government “cream[ed]” the NGO community of its best talent, the organizations required several years to recuperate. Second, being dependent on cycles of international funding, Georgian NGOs were rather slow in reacting to emerging needs and could not keep up with the breakneck speed of the authorities. Third, reformers in government mistrusted most leading Georgian NGOs, which they saw as “politically motivated,” meaning tacitly supportive of the opposition. Finally, there were ideological disagreements, as most Georgian reforms were inspired by a “neoliberal” vision, while many Georgian NGOs and international consultancies espoused more left-of-center beliefs.

For their part, the government’s critics explained its aloofness toward outside advice by accusing officials of arrogance, autocratic instincts, ideological narrowness, and being spoiled by power. Whatever one makes of these explanations, they can be summarized as follows. A background in civil-society organizations that combined some research with mostly advocacy-related activities ingrained in new members of the government a belief that they already had the best ideas. If they saw talent in the NGO sector, their first choice was to draw it into government positions rather than engage in cumbersome relations with independent organizations.

The transfer of power that followed the October 2012 parliamentary elections set off a new wave of migration from civil-society organizations to the government. It is too early to assess what major steps the new government will take in the area of public policy. How-
ever, it is reasonable to expect that if there are coherent reforms in any areas, the impulse and vision will come from graduates of Georgian NGOs. Meanwhile, with the previous ruling party, the United National Movement, moving to the opposition, some important members of the outgoing government—particularly those who played key roles in designing and implementing its reform policies—have migrated to the think-tank scene. There had previously been a few people in the “third sector” with experience in government, but large-scale relocation of successful government officials to the think-tank community could considerably enhance its capacity and professionalism.

With this change, turnover between think tanks and the government in Georgia may be becoming routine. This in itself is an important element of a functional democracy. But in the Georgian context, there is an additional reason to welcome the trend. The political party system is extremely weak, and while political opposition may be an effective tool for mobilizing public discontent, it rarely produces coherent policy ideas. More often, such ideas come from outside the political class. Civil-society organizations—especially those that do public-policy research—are therefore even more politically relevant.

Given such a dynamic, it is clearly a mistake to primarily measure the impact and policy relevance of the think-tank community by the level of cooperation between the government and think tanks at any given moment. Cooperation does exist, but its impact is limited. Quite a few government agencies have “public councils” through which they interact with think-tank representatives; this was the case under the previous government, and the new one is trying to continue and even broaden the practice. However, the public councils are not necessarily a medium for influencing policy. They are rather a way for the government to spread its message, get some direct feedback, and generally demonstrate that it plays by democratic rules. Georgian governments do occasionally outsource some implementation tasks to NGOs, for example the training of mid- and low-level personnel. International donors tend to assess such projects as “successful” because they imply cooperation between the government and civil society. Government agencies also invite NGOs to discuss official strategy documents—the National Security Concept, the Strategic Defense Review, and others—before they are adopted, leading to some minor changes. One may ask, though, whether the government compiles these documents to coordinate the actions of its different agencies, or simply to present the international community with the expected general policy statements.

Such activities are useful in many cases, but if one focuses on these “success stories,” the assessment of the think-tank scene in Georgia will be rather narrow and inadequate. Civil society’s main impact, save for the occasions when its members actually join the government, may lie in another area.

**Informing Policy through Public Debate and Civic Education**

Shaping public opinion is an important method of influencing the policy environment, and sometimes also policy decisions, in Georgia. Even nondemocratic governments tend to be somewhat responsive to public opinion. If a government’s authority is ultimately dependent on elections, it has an even greater incentive to monitor and rise to the public’s expectations.

It is often said, with good reason, that Georgians are passive when it comes to
participation in civil-society organizations. There are very few NGOs that do not depend on foreign donor support. Most of what is called “civil society” in Georgia consists of professional organizations created to implement specific projects, rather than citizens’ associations that represent and promote the interests and agendas of large segments of society. However, given this environment, even relatively small groups of citizens who are able to organize themselves around a certain agenda can become a force that political actors, including the government, must reckon with. Georgian politics play out within a very small circle of people, and it may not take much in the way of civic mobilization to influence that circle.

Public-policy debate in Georgia takes a variety of different forms. There are numerous talk shows on television and radio; many discussion meetings on specific topics, sometimes with mixed participation by civil-society experts and politicians; and debates on internet forums and social networks like Facebook. All of these may be considered instruments for shaping public opinion. Although many of these exchanges degenerate into personal attacks and bickering, there are substantive discussions of policy issues as well. Policymakers from the United National Movement government recognized in private interviews that they sometimes changed or at least modified their political decisions if public opinion was clearly hostile to them, contrary to the image of their administration as immune to outside influences. The Georgian Dream government that came to power in October 2012, at least on some occasions, has appeared rather sensitive to feedback from the public on its policies.

As noted above, debates between government and opposition in Georgia are rarely about policies. Typically, the opposition attacks the government for being allegedly corrupt or autocratic, while the government responds by questioning the character and integrity of opposition leaders. No alternative policies are proposed. After the United National Movement moved to the opposition, its leaders pledged to break this pattern and compete with the government based on a positive policy agenda. It is too early to judge whether the nature of political discussion will really change. But to date, civil-society organizations have generally been the primary instigators of and participants in public-policy debates that deserve the designation. They are also the main agents for spreading policy ideas and assessments through different media. Many think-tank figures in Georgia feel that they stand a much stronger chance of influencing policy through public opinion than through a direct approach to decision makers. A posting on Facebook may sometimes have a greater impact than a project funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the European Commission and carried out in cooperation with a given public agency. Of course, it is difficult to track and prove the policy effects of a specific NGO’s activities in these circumstances, which may be a problem for an organization that depends on donor funding and has to demonstrate that its work did have an impact.

Apart from instigating public debate, think tanks in Georgia— and, presumably, in other countries like Georgia— are tasked with broadening the scope and audience of public debate. In other words, they serve as civic educators. For instance, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development (CIPDD), led by this paper’s author, devotes the bulk of its time and resources not to carrying out its research and producing its policy papers—which admittedly do not have much direct impact on policy—but to civic education broadly understood, which usually means encouraging new groups of citizens to get involved in debating public-policy issues. Other organizations that position themselves as think tanks are also involved in this kind of work. It is a rewarding, if not the most rewarding, part of think tank activity in Georgia, and it is especially relevant in terms of the long-term development of Georgian democracy. In order to understand why, it is necessary
to revisit a larger topic: how the Georgian context defines the role of think tanks, particularly those focusing on democracy issues. A brief history of CIPDD and its work on democracy promotion will provide an illustrative example.

An Alternative Model: CIPDD and the Development of Georgia’s First Think Tanks

The history of CIPDD, created in August 1992, represents an alternative model to the more common approach of exchanges between think tanks and the government. CIPDD was the first independent organization in Georgia with democracy promotion as its chief objective. The few existing NGOs were mainly environmentalist groups. Even the term “civil society” was unusual, appearing principally in academic lectures. As for the term “think tank,” it was unknown even to the group’s founders. But in hindsight it can be said that our vision for the organization—vague as it was at that time—fit best into the concept of a public-policy think tank.

The period in which CIPDD was created can be considered a “dark age” in Georgia. It was a time of political and economic disaster. Economic output dropped by about three-fourths, the government did not control much territory beyond central parts of Tbilisi, and there were at least two civil wars running in parallel. The country was a textbook example of a failed state.

What could a public-policy think tank do in a country without a government capable of exerting control and implementing a coherent policy? We thought it could deal with the problems that led Georgia to the situation of a failed state in the first place. The simple diagnosis, shared by many of our friends, was that Georgian political thinking and behavior was not rational. Therefore a public-policy think tank was needed to instill more rationality into Georgian political life, or to begin with, into the ways we thought about and discussed politics. This did not necessarily mean influencing the specific decisions of politicians. The new Georgian government of Eduard Shevardnadze included many reasonable people, and there was near consensus at the time that Georgia could not have a better one. The task was to create precedents for talking about political issues rationally (and not from the position of fighting for power) and to involve more people in the discussion. It was assumed that this would gradually change the political culture and, eventually, political behavior.

For us, “rational” also meant liberal and democratic. This is not necessarily correct from the point of view of political theory, because political behavior that does not conform to democratic standards can be perfectly rational as well. But we believed, and still believe, that for Georgia in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, liberal democracy was the only rational choice, and that autocratic temptations were a threat to Georgia’s national goals.

Since 1992, Georgia has made very important steps forward. It has yet to become a fully functional democracy, but it has developed a state that performs its basic functions and pursues public policies successfully. Still, CIPDD’s mission within Georgian society can be described in the same terms: we want to instill a greater sense of rationality in Georgian political thinking and behavior.

The first and most basic task is to take stock of the current reality, though that is far from simple. Many external observers complain that it is often extremely difficult to understand what is actually happening in Georgia, as different political actors and commentators give radically different views. Georgian media are also notorious for serving political interests rather than informing the public and providing a platform for different opinions. It would be extremely arrogant to claim that unlike everyone else, we were beyond bias. But we did try our best to provide the public (Georgian and international) with a balanced analysis of different segments of the Georgian reality.

Our very first projects, for instance, in-
cluded producing *Georgian Chronicle*, an English-language monthly summary and analysis of events in Georgia. We continued producing it through 1997, and quite unusually, we did not have any donor support for it. At the time this product was unique, because systematic analysis of Georgian developments was rare. To this day the Chronicle serves as an important source for researchers who want to make sense of that very complex period in Georgia’s transformation.

Over the years, CIPDD has produced research on different aspects of Georgia’s democratic development. In many areas, our research continues to be the most authoritative and comprehensive of its kind. This can be said, for instance of a study of Georgian political parties that was carried out by CIPDD staff in cooperation with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. The findings were summarized in a book coauthored by Ghia Nodia and Alvaro Pinto-Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape in Georgia—Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects* (Delft: Eburon Delft, 2006). A somewhat smaller publication written by Ghia Nodia, *Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges* (2005), remains the most comprehensive account on that topic produced in Georgia. There were numerous other publications on the Georgian political system, on the regional media, on the state of local government, on the problems of ethnic minorities, on the state of civil-military relations, and the like. In all these areas, CIPDD continues to be an authoritative organization that is capable of providing comprehensive and reliable research.

Another important component of our work—by a rough calculation, some 70 percent of CIPDD activities fall into this category—is focused on public debate and civic education. The events in question include conferences, roundtable discussions, public debates, and trainings, among other formats. Participants range from government ministers to high school students, and the topics are similarly diverse. However, all of these activities are unified by one general goal: creating a more informed and competent citizenry and encouraging a culture of rational debate on public-policy issues—something that, as most observers would agree, Georgia largely lacks.

Naturally, specific projects have specific objectives. For instance, when Georgia was shaken by numerous instances of religious violence, CIPDD initiated a program of religious tolerance trainings for schoolteachers. It was widely believed that most schoolteachers in Georgia spread a message of intolerance toward minorities, and there were many skeptics who thought that no trainings could change these attitudes. The assumption proved wrong. Many schoolteachers admitted that the project marked the first time they had taken part in any rational discussion of religious pluralism in class, and that they saw the issue very differently as a result.

It is extremely difficult to measure how such activities influence the political process, though we believe that they ultimately have an impact. In some CIPDD projects, we cooperated directly with government bodies, trained public servants, took them on study tours abroad, gave suggestions on specific issues, and submitted feedback on draft government documents. CIPDD has participated in numerous advisory councils set up by the government. However, the organization’s indirect influences might ultimately be more important, even if they are harder to measure. A number of people who took part in our events, or worked directly for CIPDD, later became members of parliament, government ministers, or other government officeholders of varying rank. Presumably the approaches and messages they picked up from our events and activities have affected the way they act while in government.

**Lessons from CIPDD: Conducting Democracy Research in a Semi-democratic Environment**

When discussing the role and relevance of democracy research, it is important
to distinguish it from other kinds of public-policy research. In the latter case, the task is to improve the quality and efficiency of public institutions’ performance in a specific area, such as healthcare or law enforcement. The assumption here is that policymakers are really interested in achieving the stated objectives, and there is simply a difference of opinion on the best way to do so. Think tanks therefore have a chance to convince policymakers that the model they are proposing offers a superior means of achieving the established goal.

The role of democracy research in the Georgian context is qualitatively different. As noted above, it is still questionable whether Georgia’s political system may be called democratic or not. The country is usually considered to be somewhere between democracy and autocracy; analysts often use the term “competitive authoritarianism.” This means that the public-policy community is not simply fine-tuning specific democratic institutions so that they can adequately confront emerging challenges, as may be the case in “old” established democracies and in the new but largely consolidated democracies of Eastern Europe. Instead, the task in Georgia is to help transform a superficially democratic—or predominantly autocratic, depending on the opinion of a given analyst—state into a substantively democratic political system. It is about changing the nature of the political regime.

Consequently, one cannot presume that policymakers really want to achieve the objectives that democracy think tanks have in mind. If a political system is less than fully democratic, it is either because the ruling elites do not conform to democratic standards and are not interested in doing so (according to the agency approach), or because they do not confront strong enough balancing forces, such as alternative political and societal elites, developed structures of civil society, or whatever else may contain them (the structural approach). Either way, it is uncertain who the target audience for a democracy think tank’s recommendations should be. Typical Georgian think tankers will say that they produce policy recommendations because they believe they are right, even though they do not really believe decision makers will take them up. In that case, the target audience is some kind of ideal decision maker who does not really exist. Such an approach allows democracy think tanks to keep up their self-esteem—and retain the esteem of the Western donor community—without really being useful.

This raises the general question of how autocratic countries become democratic, or rather how so-called hybrid regimes or competitive authoritarian systems turn into full democracies. Despite voluminous literature on democratization, there is no real theory, save the assumption that it is all unpredictable and tends to be more dependent on agency than on structure. (Structural arguments are most often used to explain the failure of democratization, not its success.) The belief that removing an autocratic regime and replacing it with a new government, preferably one whose members have been exposed to Western democratic ideas and experiences, will by itself bring democracy seems to have been dispelled in the Georgian context. Although this method essentially worked in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, in Georgia there have been a number of replacements of real or alleged autocratic regimes with new governments that promised democracy but failed to deliver a genuinely democratic political system. In particular, the 2003 Rose Revolution brought to power a government dominated by graduates of Western democracy-promotion programs, and a large majority of analysts agree that it failed to entrench democratic practices in Georgia. It did bring some progress, becoming the first Georgian government to organize elections in which the ruling party lost and gave up power in a peaceful and orderly manner. But even this may not prove sustainable. The first steps of the new Georgian Dream government that came to power in 2012, which really does represent the hopes and aspirations of broad segments of Georgian society, raised significant and justified fears that it could
There are probably some deeper structural reasons for the failures of Georgia’s democratization process. One may be that there is a shortage of “social capital” in general or of intermediate institutions of democracy such as political parties, civic associations, and other instruments of civic involvement.

A think tank focused on democracy research cannot pretend it is relevant in this environment if it simply offers ideas for institutional reforms that cannot bring any substantive change to the system, even assuming policymakers choose to take them up. It is rather obvious that the core problem of democratic development in Georgia does not lie in the deficiencies of the legal environment, though such deficiencies do exist. In a relatively recent example, the Georgian NGO community successfully advocated for two changes in media legislation. One made it illegal for media organizations to be registered in offshore zones, forcing them to be more transparent about ownership structures. The other obliged owners of cable networks to transmit the signals of all television companies, whether they wanted to or not (the so-called Must Carry rule). These changes might have been welcome in themselves, but they could not address the root cause of substantive deficiencies in the Georgian media scene, namely the dependence of the media on their political patrons and the related ability of the strongest patron to dominate the media landscape.

Under these circumstances, the first task of democracy-research organizations may be to stimulate more honest and adequate debate with regard to the core reasons behind democracy failures, even though such a debate will not bring about any sizeable changes in the short run. At the same time, it is an important long-term task to strengthen democracy resources by involving more people and more groups in the democracy debate, encouraging the culture of dialogue at different levels of society, and producing more ideas and concepts that may be unconventional but nevertheless stimulate thought and activity. This could also include scrutinizing the core concepts of democracy, not to weaken commitment to democratic ideals, but to foster a more ample and realistic understanding of them. There are different obstacles to successful democratization in Georgia, one of which may be a deeply undemocratic notion of democracy as a preconceived template that can be applied thoughtlessly to any given country.